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Ever since John Rawls published Political Liberalism, political justifi cation 
has been one of the central topics in political philosophy. How can citizens, 
endorsing substantively different and often incompatible yet reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines acknowledge the same laws and political decisions 
as legitimate? In other words, how can citizens recognize the authority 
of some laws or decisions when they simultaneously see them as morally 
wrong or epistemically incorrect? Almost all scholars, following Rawls, solve 
this problem by ascribing some form of legitimacy-generating potential to 
the decision-making procedures that have produced these contestable re-
sults. The procedure, they claim, has some moral or epistemic qualities 
that all qualifi ed (or reasonable) citizens can recognize and affi rm, and it 
is because of these qualities that citizens can endorse laws and decisions 
even though they fi nd them substantively wrong or incorrect. Maria Paola 
Ferretti’s The Public Perspective. Public Justifi cation and the Ethics of Be-
lief follows this line of thought but introduces an innovative and original 
approach. Namely, Ferretti claims that the practice of political justifi cation 
is possible only where people endorse a common ethics of belief, a cluster of 
epistemic and moral norms that guide formation and reformation of the be-
liefs that inform our public perspective (1). Her position thus departs from 
many existing accounts of public justifi cation (particularly those presented 
by Rawls and Gaus) and focuses on (i) common epistemic rules and (ii) a 
shared commitment to a regulative, non-dogmatic idea of truth as necessary 
components of the process of public justifi cation.
The book introduces or brings into focus many important and under-
discussed ideas. For example, most authors assume there is an inherent 
gap between our factual beliefs and our values and normative claims. Fer-
retti challenges this sharp division and asserts that our factual beliefs often 
shape our normative claims—some of the worst failures in citizens’ norma-
tive deliberation (e.g. The Holocaust and genocide of indigenous peoples) 
had to be supported by corrupt science and pseudoscience (e.g. Nazi eugen-
ics). Furthermore, most authors, following Rawls and Gaus, endorse the 
idea that we have a moral (and not epistemic) reason to abide by the con-
straints of public reason, i.e. to abstain from introducing the arguments 
that other (qualifi ed) citizens cannot affi rm or recognize as intelligible in 
the public deliberation. Ferretti, on the other hand, argues that there is 
a strong epistemic reason not to introduce some contestable claims in the 
public deliberation, and differentiates between epistemic commitments we 
have when justifying some belief to ourselves and when justifying the same 
belief to the public. These thought-provoking ideas, paired with imaginative 
and resourceful argumentation, are alone a good reason to give the book a 
thoughtful consideration.
However, apart from addressing some of these interesting questions, 
Ferretti’s book undertakes a far more demanding task—it aims to estab-
lish a link between our moral requirements and epistemic commitments, 
thus offering a mixed account of political legitimacy. The book draws on 
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a tradition that goes back to Locke and his ethics of belief as developed 
in An Essay on Human Understanding. Locke postulated that we have an 
‘alethic obligation’ to regulate our beliefs so that they track truth (or what 
is most probably true) and recommends rationally revising all beliefs that 
are sources of confl ict or debate. Ferretti’s goal is to draw on Locke’s lesson 
in order to answer some contemporary questions about public justifi cation. 
The ethics of belief for citizens of a liberal democratic society is based on 
logic, factual evidence and the state of the art in sciences. These epistemic 
rules do not ensure that citizens reach consensus in all situations, but that 
they can meaningfully talk to each other in a way that is adequately pub-
lic (3). The ethics of belief thus represents an integral part of the ethics 
of citizens living together in a plural society as free and equal moral and 
epistemic agents.
The book is divided in seven chapters. The introduction presents the 
main aims of the book, but also displays the central motives that urged 
Ferretti to complete the manuscript. Namely, the declining trust in experts 
and the rapid increase of fake news in the media have started our transition 
to “post-truth societies” (2, 170), where ethics of belief and the aspiration 
towards right or correct laws and decisions has been disregarded, and the 
only hope for public justifi cation rests in purely-procedural (and non-epis-
temic) qualities of a decision-making procedure. This shift can have disas-
trous impact on the quality of our political decisions but can also distort the 
democratic process and turn it into a simple majority rule characterized by 
domination of one group over the other. Ferretti sees the ethics of belief as a 
regulating principle that can improve our decision-making process, but also 
defi ne the proper role of science in a democratic society.
Second chapter frames the discussion by setting the idea of public rea-
son as a regulative ideal that determines the kind of reasons that can be 
introduced in the process of public justifi cation. Political authority thus has 
to be justifi ed by reasons available to all reasonable (qualifi ed) citizens—we 
respect others as free and equal moral agents by justifying coercive laws 
and policies through public (and only public) reasons. Ferretti distinguish-
es her own position from the two dominant alternatives: consensus view 
defended by John Rawls and convergence view defended by Gerald Gaus. 
Both positions, Ferretti claims, have serious fl aws. Rawls’ conception of 
public reason, based on shared agreement on the premises in the justifi ca-
tion process, is too conservative (20) since it precludes new considerations 
and inputs (e.g. new scientifi c discoveries, insights from the perspectives of 
minority groups) from entering the public deliberation and challenging the 
commonly accepted premises. Gaus’ view, based on joint agreement on laws 
and policies (rather than reasons supporting them), lacks publicity (28): 
citizens are unable to see the agreement as a joint endeavor since they can-
not critically evaluate laws and policies from the perspective of all others. 
Ferretti believes her position, based on Lockean social epistemology, can 
successfully avoid these objections.
After a somewhat unnecessary sketch of a debate between foundational-
ism and coherentism, where the author ends up endorsing a moderate ver-
sion of foundationalism, Ferretti introduces alethic obligation, Locke’s claim 
that each epistemic agent should strive to believe what is true. Strength 
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of our beliefs should be proportionate to the degree of probability that the 
proposition in question is true (44). Furthermore, the required degree of 
probability depends on what is at stake: if we are going to make coercive 
laws that will affect others around us, we need to ground them in well-
regulated and very probable beliefs. Ferretti’s view proceeds to embrace a 
conclusion similar to that suggested by Robert Talisse, Cheryl Misak and 
other proponents of pragmatist account of epistemic democracy—very prob-
able beliefs are those produced by an epistemically reliable procedure. If 
we see other people as free and equal moral and epistemic agents, we have 
both moral and epistemic obligation to show respect for their autonomy by 
adhering to such an epistemically reliable procedure when we make collec-
tive decisions.
The fourth chapter brings a comprehensive overview of the use of the 
term ‘reasonable’ in contemporary liberal philosophy. Ferretti rejects dis-
tinction between reasonable and non-reasonable people, as well as counting 
only the former as participants in public justifi cation (75). We should focus 
on reasonable beliefs rather than on people as reasonable. As noted in the 
third chapter, only very probable beliefs—those that can be publicly justi-
fi ed—should be used to ground laws and public policies. One might thus 
have reason to hold onto her belief that cannot be publicly justifi ed, but she 
cannot use such a belief in the collective decision-making process. For ex-
ample, Galileo had good reasons to personally believe that the Earth moves, 
yet the available evidence was insuffi cient to present a public justifi cation 
for such a claim (it become available in the 19th century). Therefore, found-
ing laws and policies (e.g. calendar reform) on heliocentric thesis could not 
be done publicly, though Galileo was justifi ed in following Copernicus’ view. 
Following Locke, Ferretti claims that we have freedom to believe what ap-
pears true to us, and we have a duty to justify those beliefs when we want 
them to have impact on decisions that have public relevance (88, 92).
Some might remain unpersuaded regarding the Locke’s method and 
its ability to solve complex disagreements and confl icts in a world charac-
terized by reasonable value pluralism. However, Ferretti holds that many 
value disagreements are fueled by disagreements on facts, often caused by 
epistemological and political asymmetries (100). Citizens often overesti-
mate their own expertise or the credibility of evidence in support of their 
favorite (descriptive) beliefs (e.g. debates on dioxins, GM food, hormone-
containing beef, nuclear waste storage, the greenhouse effect and cloning), 
which in turn shape their normative attitudes. Locke’s ethics of belief can 
help us resolve disputes on many of these (descriptive) issues, and can thus 
prevent some value disagreement from emerging. Furthermore, author 
claims, Locke’s method for belief reformation can help us in ranking the 
desirability of political aims (104) we want to achieve, thus resolving some 
of the value confl icts. Of course, Ferretti is well-aware that, even when ap-
propriately applying an ethics of beliefs, logic and consistency, people do not 
always reach conclusive agreement.
The sixth chapter discusses the limits in the application of the ethics 
of belief. Ferretti has already argued, in fourth chapter, that demanding 
requirements of the ethics of belief should not be applied on beliefs one does 
not use in the process of public justifi cation. We are not required to justify 
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to the others why we hold a specifi c belief, unless we want to ground some 
coercive law or public policy on such a belief. Ferretti discusses the value 
of freedom of thought, rejecting some instrumental justifi cations (e.g. J. S. 
Mill) and endorsing the idea that protection of a sphere of personal freedom 
enjoys a certain priority in our political reasoning (138). Her justifi cation of 
the priority of (equal) freedom follows Rawls (and Quong) and is based on 
citizens’ equal moral status.
The fi nal chapter introduces several challenges to Ferretti’s position. 
Our beliefs are formed within a culture and are often infl uenced by a cul-
tural tradition. When different cultures coexist within a single state, their 
members might fi nd it impossible to collectively practice ethics of belief 
since they have substantively different assessments of probability of some 
key beliefs. Ferretti claims that, in some instances, there are good reasons 
not to press with too demanding constraints of the ethics of belief—some 
cultural communities should be left to arrange some aspects of their public 
life. The reason for this, however, is not in the value of particular cultures, 
but in the equal moral status of citizens endorsing different moral doctrines 
and cultural practices (164).
Ferretti’s book is undoubtedly an important contribution to the ongo-
ing debate on public justifi cation. Her focus on Locke’s alethic obligation 
and the ethics of belief represents a novel and underexplored approach that 
tries to unite moral and epistemic considerations in the process of collec-
tive justifi cation of laws and policies. However, I would like to stress two 
minor diffi culties that need to be addressed. First, some might argue that 
Ferretti misinterprets Rawls when she criticizes his consensus approach to 
public reason as too conservative. Emancipatory ideas, but also new scien-
tifi c discoveries, challenge the commonly accepted ideas and rules that they 
support. Rawls’ account is criticized to be too rigid to appreciate these new 
perspectives. Namely, it seems that Rawls addresses idealized citizens in 
idealized conditions and is thus unable to accommodate new discoveries or 
shifts in public perspective that happen in the real world. However, Rawls’ 
four stage sequence can be used to tackle this worry. He clearly states that 
the political decision-making process consists of four stages: fi rst we deter-
mine principles of justice (in idealized conditions, behind the veil of igno-
rance), and then we proceed to draft a constitution, form appropriate legisla-
tion, and fi nally, we implement this legislation on particular cases, through 
public administration and courts. Only the fi rst stage takes place in ideal-
ized conditions—constitutional changes can be motivated by the electorate, 
as was the case in “the three most innovative periods in American consti-
tutional history: the founding of 1787–91, Reconstruction and New Deal” 
(PL, 406). Rawls indicates that the purpose of an amendment is to adjust 
basic constitutional values to changing political and social circumstances, 
or to incorporate into constitution a broader and more inclusive understat-
ing of those values (PL, 238). The three amendments related to the Civil 
War all do this (abolition of slavery), as does the Nineteenth Amendment 
granting women the vote. These changes were, at least in part, conducted 
after widespread false factual beliefs (regarding the inferiority of women or 
African Americans) were disputed. It seems that Rawls’ public reason is not 
so conservative. Except for the fi rst stage (principles of justice), when we 
632 Book Reviews
consider idealized citizens behind the veil of ignorance, all other are (to a 
certain degree) performed by real citizens in a real world and can take into 
account new scientifi c discoveries and shifts in the public perspective.
Second, it is important to emphasize that Ferretti and scholars she ad-
dresses (e.g. John Rawls) often write about substantively different things. 
Rawls refers to public justifi cation through shared reasons as a precondi-
tion for political legitimacy. Liberal principle of legitimacy specifi es the 
minimum that has to be met in order for the exercise of coercive political 
power to be fully proper—this power has to be exercised in accordance with 
a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals ac-
ceptable to their common human reason. (PL, 137). Ferretti, however, does 
not address the question of political legitimacy. She focuses on the ethics of 
belief as political ethics, thus setting a more demanding set of constrains 
than Rawls does. Considering they are writing about different things (what 
makes a procedure legitimate / what makes a procedure morally justifi ed), 
it seems that Ferretti’s contribution does not represent an alternative to 
Rawls’ account, but a completely new contribution in a separate discussion. 
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